Fact and Fiction in the Neuropsychology of Art by Frigg, Roman & Howard, Catherine
 1 
Fact and Fiction in the Neuropsychology of Art 
 
Roman Frigg, London School of Economics 
Catherine Howard, University of New South Wales1 
 
In: Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens: The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology,  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 54-70 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The time honoured philosophical issue of how to resolve the mind/body problem has taken a 
more scientific turn of late. Instead of discussing issues of the soul and emotion and person 
and their reduction to a physical form, we now ask ourselves how well-understood cognitive 
and social concepts fit into the growing and changing field of neuropsychology. One of the 
many projects that have come out of this new scientific endeavour is Zaidel’s (2005) inquiry 
into the neuropsychological bases of art.2  
 
Zaidel’s book is widely considered to be a landmark piece the field, and for this reason it 
deserves careful consideration. Her approach to the neuropsychology of art combines 
neurological, evolutionary and cognitive perspectives. One aspect of this programme is the 
study of brain damage in established artists: the relationship between art and certain brain 
regions is investigated through an examination of the difference between post-damage and-
damage works of a painter suffering brain damage. This aspect of Zaidel’s programme is the 
focus of this essay. Our conclusion will be critical: the methods used are inappropriate to the 
subject matter, and progress in the study of neuropsychology of art is more likely to be made 
if the topic is approached in a different way. We should emphasise, however, that we do not 
reach this conclusion because we generally have a sceptical perspective on reductionist 
programmes such as Zaidel’s. In our view there is no good reason to believe that we could 
not, at least in principle, one day have a thorough understanding of the physiology behind our 
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ability to create, imagine, enjoy and recognize art. The aim of Zaidel’s project is a good one. 
However, it is important that the methods used to work out reductive relations are sound, and 
in fact have the desired implications. 
 
In her investigation Zaidel uses a range of established artists (i.e. artists who are recognised as 
such by art history and society broadly construed) from a range of time periods and artistic 
persuasions as objects of study. Our main criticism is that this focus is mistaken for two 
reasons. First, to address the questions that neuroscience can reasonably be expected address, 
there is no need to focus on established artists. In fact, art school undergraduates would not be 
less valuable subjects. Second, the choice of historical figures as subjects forces Zaidel to 
extract her data from sketchy and incomplete historical records (incomplete in that they do not 
provide detailed information about the exact nature of brain damage suffered), which rarely, if 
ever, provide data that are fit for purpose. Studying ‘ordinary’ art students rather than 
established historical figures also makes this problem go away. And this is what we 
recommend should happen: rather then relying on gappy historical records, data should be 
gathered on living painters using state of the art technology, and these painters can be chosen 
arbitrarily since nothing depends on their standing in the art world.  
 
 
2. Learning from Brain Damage in Established Artists 
 
Zaidel investigates the neuropsychology of art by looking at subjects who have suffered brain 
damage and then investigating the artistic implications of this damage. To do so she has 
collected anecdotal and historical data about artists throughout history. Zaidel’s research is 
extensive, and covers artists from all areas of art: the visual arts, literature, music composition 
and performance, and even film. Zaidel’s goal is to find what common elements span these 
varied concepts of art, and ultimately to find out how our brains process, create and recognise 
these works from any field as art. However, Zaidel is not just interested in any old piece; her 
focus is works of art that have been produced by established artists, that is ones whose status 
as artists is confirmed both by professional art history as well as society at large and whose 
works remain recognised and awed as art throughout time and within recognised and 
prestigious establishments. In other words, in her study of the neurology of art, Zaidel is 
interested in studying artists and works that belong within the upper echelon of the artistic 
world: ‘Art’, with a capital A, as we shall call it. 
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In this chapter we aim to give an account of the method Zaidel uses to achieve her goal. For 
the sake of clarity, we will limit ourselves to those studies relating to visual artists, 
specifically painters. We will also limit these examples to painters who have suffered specific 
neurological damage. Despite the fact that Zaidel argues from a range of conditions, both 
physical (such as defective colour vision) and neurological (such as brain damage caused by 
strokes), we limit our attention to neurological conditions since these are more pertinent to the 
issue at stake and help us bring into focus her claims regarding the role of neurology in art. 
 
We will use two of Zaidel’s examples to examine her method (this is for ease of presentation 
only; our points could just as well be made using other cases). The first is the case of the 
Bulgarian painter Zlatio Boyadjiev (pp. 30-31).3 In 1951 Boyadjiev, then 48 years old, 
suffered a stroke within the left hemisphere of his brain. This left Boyadjiev with permanent 
right hand paralysis (his dominant hand) and mixed aphasia. After his stroke, Boyadjiev 
learned how to use his left hand to paint. After gaining proficient skill at this new task, he 
continued to produce work that was acclaimed by critics and exhibited in museums. His 
ability to realistically depict figures was unchanged. However, compared to the pre-stroke 
period his use of colours became less exuberant and less varied; the perspective was less 
convergent (with some pieces lacking depth altogether); a left-right mirror symmetry became 
typical of many of his compositions; there were fewer figures present in each piece (creating a 
feeling of less overall complexity in the piece); and the themes now blended imagery and real 
themes within a single work. 
 
The second example is that of portrait painter William Utermohlen (pp. 43-44). From the age 
of 57 onwards, Utermohlen experienced a slow deterioration of global cognitive ability due to 
the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. An MRI scan revealed generalised cortical atrophy with no 
asymmetry. As the disease progressed, Zaidel notes that Utermohlen’s trademark use of 
realistic depictions tapered off, and a use of more abstract techniques ensued. Facial 
distortions were introduced into his portraits, perspective and depth were slowly lost over 
time, and although colour and form were still used, colour was left unblended and paint was 
applied with broad brush strokes which gave the paintings the air of patchiness. Eventually he 
gave up colour altogether and resorted to just sketching with a pencil. 
 
                                                
3 Unless indicated otherwise, page numbers in this chapter refer to Zaidel’s (2005).  
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The thrust of these examples (and many others in the book) is to correlate alterations in 
artistic style with alterations in the brain, and then draw a conclusion about which parts of the 
brain are involved in the production of artworks. In more detail, the method consists in the 
following steps: 
 
1.)  Examine an artist’s work before damage. 
2.)  Examine the same artist’s work after having suffered brain damage. 
3.)  Identify aesthetically relevant aspects in the artist’s work that have changed. 
4.)  Assume that these changes appear exclusively due to the brain damage. 
5.)  Identify the nature of the brain damage suffered. 
6.)  Conclude that the change in the brain is responsible for the change in artistic style and 
that therefore the part of the brain affected by the disease is responsible for the 
production of the pre-stroke style. 
 
In her case studies the last stage is often left implicit, but the overall discussion clearly 
indicates that such an ‘attributive’ step is the aim of the exercise. In the first case, for instance, 
the conclusion clearly is that damage to the left hemisphere was responsible for the changes in 
Boyadjiev’s style. This, then, provides us with a possible clue as to where in the brain certain 
artistic capabilities are located. For want of a better term, we refer to this method as the 
method of diachronic difference, MDD for short.4 
 
In this chapter, we aim to closely scrutinize Zaidel’s method and argue that it suffers from 
serious problems. Our criticisms fall into two categories. The first is Zaidel’s application of 
MDD. The second criticism focuses on the use of MDD as an adequate cornerstone for 
research of this nature. Here we will examine similar projects that have tried to use MDD in 
this fashion, and the problems that subsequently arose affecting their study. We will argue 
that Zaidel’s study of brain damage in artists is not immune to these same problems. Finally, 
we propose an approach that avoids these pitfalls and may lead to a great wealth of interesting 
information regarding neurology, aesthetics and art. 
 
 
 
                                                
4 This name echoes Mill’s ‘method of difference’ (1843, Book 3, Ch. VIII, Sec. 2). We add ‘diachronic’ to make 
explicit that we are comparing properties at different times.  
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3. Aiming Too High 
 
The first problem we will deal with is Zaidel’s use of MDD. Our problem becomes palpable 
as soon as we are pressed to layout what the above examples really show. Upon closer 
inspection this seems to be rather little. The first example suggests that there is a connection 
between brain damage to the left hemisphere and the absence of perspective as well as an 
unimaginative use of colour; the second case suggests that there is connection between 
abstraction and the malfunctioning of the cortex as a whole.  Even if one grants that these 
findings generalise to other cases – which is by no means clear; in fact, Zaidel (p. 31) herself 
points out that the loss of the ability to produce perspectival representations is often 
associated with lesions of the right rather than the left hemisphere – they are too unspecific to 
give us serious hints about the connections between the workings of the brain and the 
production of art. Unless the brain damage is clearly located, we cannot draw useful 
conclusion about which parts, or functional units, of the brain are involved in the production 
of art, which undermines the very project of a neuropsychology of art. Locating a capability 
somewhere in the left hemisphere, or even the entire cortex, is not specific enough to provide 
serious clues about the neurological underpinnings of art. And this problem is by no means 
restricted to the two examples we have chosen. The book gathers together a large collection of 
cases, but only few, if any, receive detailed treatment. For the most part the descriptions are 
short and coarse. 
 
By and large the brevity of the discussion is owed to the fact that historical records provide 
only limited information. Zaidel places great emphasis on investigating established artists –
Otto Dix, Louis Corinth, and Willem de Kooning are but a few of the eminent artist discussed 
– and where she considers lesser(-known) artist she is careful to chose only ones who are of 
some art-historic interest. The basic problem is that our knowledge about the conditions of 
these artists is, as a matter of fact, limited. For one, diagnostic techniques of the kind we have 
today were not available at the time and hence we often only have the crudest of descriptions 
of their neurological conditions; for another, medical records often contain only limited 
information about brain damage suffered by an artist. Although Zaidel is not to blame for 
sketchiness of available historical records, there is a serious question about whether such 
records are able to form the basis of a research programme in neuroscience. They are not. Far 
more detailed knowledge of the neurological conditions of patients would have to be available 
in order to form a sound basis of an investigation of the functioning of the brain in the 
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production of art. Current neuroscience has evolved to the point where we understand in great 
detail the structures of various regions of the brain and the interconnections between them. In 
fact, we now have a very detailed map of the brain telling us even how individual columns (a 
small bundle of neurons operation as a unit) work and in which functions of the brain they are 
involved.  When studying specific brain damage to attribute artistic skills and practices to 
brain regions, we can only make useful claims through locating damage on this finely drawn 
chart. It is no longer reasonable to make significant claims with a loose description of the 
location of the relevant damage; locating damage in the right or the left hemisphere, or even 
in the visual cortex as a whole, does no longer further our understanding of the functioning of 
the brain in general, or the neurology of art in particular. 5  
 
The focus on eminent historical figures should also be given up for another, and independent, 
reason. In order to see what this reason is, let us first give a more abstract characterisation of 
MDD: 
 
1.)  Examine a person’s capability of doing X before brain damage 
2.)  Examine the same person’s capability of doing X after the person has suffered brain 
damage. 
3.)  Identify relevant differences in the person’s capability of doing X before and after 
having suffered brain damage. Call this difference ΔX. 
4.)  Assume that the brain damage suffered is the only cause of ΔX. 
5.)  Identify the nature of the brain damage suffered. Call the difference between the 
brain’s condition before and after brain damage ΔC. 
6.)  Conclude that ΔC is the cause of ΔX. 
 
This method suffers from all the well known difficulties of inductive reasoning,6 but these do 
not concern us here; we assume that they can be circumvented successfully in the relevant 
                                                
5 Section 3 of Zaidel’s contribution to this book may be read as suggesting that the aim of the investigation is not 
so much correlating certain artistic skills (or loss thereof) with certain precisely circumscribed parts of the brain, 
but rather to show that artistic talent, skill and creativity are diffusely located in the brain and do not have a 
particular centre. Even if this is the goal, the problems remain the same: our failure to precisely locate certain 
conditions does not imply that they have no precise location.  
6 Let us mention but some: the inductive step of generalising from the sample investigated to the entire reference 
class is notoriously problematic; the assumption that there are no confounding factors (premise 4) is highly 
problematic in the current context and has to be accepted as an article of faith; and neurological data is nearly 
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cases because our criticism of Zaidel’s approach is orthogonal to concerns about induction. 
The point we want to emphasise is that there are at least two conditions on X for a legitimate 
application of MDD. The first condition we call the requirement of specificity. It must be clear 
what it means to do X – there cannot be any ambiguities about the concept itself – and we 
need operational criteria to unequivocally decide on any given occasion whether a person is 
doing X or not. If there are ambiguities about X, or if in an experiment we cannot decide 
whether the person really does X, then looking for the neurological foundations of X is an ill-
defined problem. 
 
The second condition we call the requirement of individuality. This condition requires that 
whether the person under investigation does X (or fails to do so) only depends on that 
person’s mental state and not on other persons’ mental states.7 Let us illustrate this with an 
example. Whether John feels pain depends only on the state of his brain (and possibly his 
nervous system); other peoples’ mental activities play no part in John’s being in pain. By 
contrast, whether John is behaving politely is not only a function of his brain state. Behaving 
politely depends on other people’s preferences and on social norms which are beyond the 
control of the individual. For instance, while in traditional Islamic cultures it is impolite to eat 
with your left hand, it is impolite in most Western societies not to use both hands to eat. If 
John eats with both hands, he is behaving politely or impolitely depending on the cultural 
beliefs of people around him. But John’s action is the exactly the same in either case – he is 
eating with both hands – and hence the mental actions that guide his behaviour must be the 
same too.8 For this reason, the concept of behaving politely cannot be studied from a 
neuroscience point of view, because the subject matter of such an investigation is an 
individual’s brain state. It is a necessary condition for activity X to be open to neurological 
                                                                                                                                                   
always messy, even when experiments are conducted under strict control, and hence neurological condition itself 
is in part speculated. 
7 Doing X may also depend on facts about the world, as long as they do not depend on other persons’ beliefs and 
desires. For instance, if we assume externalism to be true, then it must be the case that there are objects in the 
world for a person to have object-involving thoughts. This dependency on facts is harmless in the context of the 
current discussion. What is at issue here is dependence on other persons’ mental states.  
8 One can, of course, investigate a person’s disposition or willingness to respect a given set of social rules or the 
execution of a particular action that is in line with the rules (e.g. keeping at a certain distance when talking to 
someone). But this is not the same as investigating behaving politely per se: someone can be willing to respect 
rules and yet fail to do so, or keeping a certain distance to your interlocutor may be polite in one context but not 
in another one.  
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investigation that the execution of X be a function only of the individual’s state of mind, and 
not on what happens in the person’s social environment. 
 
The X at stake in Zaidel’s investigation is ‘producing a work of Art’. Unfortunately producing 
a work of Art clearly fails to satisfy the first condition, and, at least given current views 
concerning the nature of art, it does not satisfy the second condition either. As regards the first 
condition, it is a matter of fact that there is no agreement about what defines a work of art.9 
Classical definitions which construe art as imitation or representation (Plato), a medium of 
transmission of feelings (Tolstoy), intuitive expression (Croce), or significant form (Bell) are 
believed by many to be seriously defective. More recent approaches include functionalism 
(Beardsley), proceduralism (Dickie), or approaches emphasising historical reflexivity (Danto). 
For our current concerns the relative merits of these approaches are immaterial. The salient 
point is that there is a plethora of different schools of thought and that producing a piece of art 
means something different to each of them. Hence there is no unanimous view of how a piece 
of art is to be identified, which undermines any attempt to identify the neurological basis of 
the production of art. 
 
Assume now, for the sake of argument, that this dispute could be resolved. Of course we can 
only speculate about how the conflict will be resolved, but at least given the state of play in 
the current discussion, this resolution is unlikely to be in line with MDD. Most contemporary 
definitions of art in one way or another explicitly appeal to social practices and the role of 
institutions (this is explicit, for instance, in Dickie’s institutional theory) in order to define art: 
what turns an artefact into a work of art is neither a particular property of the object itself nor 
a specific characteristic of its process of production, but rather the role it plays in certain 
social practices. This suggests that art is more like behaving politely than like feeling pain, 
and hence does not lend itself to a neurological investigation at all since it fails on account of 
the requirement of individuality. 
 
Although Zaidel does not discuss this point, there is implicit acknowledgment of it in her 
discussion, since any reference to artistic value (or any of its cognates) are conspicuously 
absent from her discussion of actual cases (as opposed to programmatic statements). The 
discussion of specific bodies of work focuses on the use of perspective, the choice of colour, 
the level of abstraction, the curviness of lines, the smoothness of boundaries, the thickness of 
                                                
9 For a survey of the various positions held in this debate see Stephen Davies (2005).  
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layers of paint, the characteristics of brush strokes, the presence of symmetries, the distortion 
of objects, the choice of motives, and the like. What Zaidel is really examining is how 
neurological damage affects the specific representations that are being processed by the 
artists, and how in turn the damage affects their ability to create their brushstrokes and 
accurately represent what they desire on their canvas. These (and related) aspects no doubt 
play a role in the appreciation of an artwork, but they are not specific to Art with capital A 
and it seems unnecessary to restrict attention to these ‘upper echelon artists’ if all what is at 
stake is only specific technical aspects of their work. To discuss, say, the use of perspective 
we don’t have look at geniuses of the calibre of van Gogh; the canvasses produced by Sunday 
painters, primary school teachers, distraught managers seeking relaxation in painting, and 
commercial painters producing pieces that are sold on tourist markets are not less valuable as 
‘data points’. Once we limit our attention to a specific aspect of pictorial representation (like 
the use of perspective), it just doesn’t matter any more whether the pieces we look at count as 
Art, or whether they are merely canvasses produced for any number of other reasons. In other 
words, the fact that the subjects studied were established artists seems to play no role at all in 
the conclusions that we are supposed to draw from the cases! 
 
This is not merely an academic point. In fact, its practical implications can hardly be 
overstated. It is the focus on eminent figures that force Zaidel to use uncontrolled and sketchy 
data extracted from anecdotal artists’ histories as a basis for claims concerning a low level 
neurological story for a change in aesthetic perception of an artists work, and we have argued 
above that this is detrimental to her research programme. Once we recognise that there is no 
necessity to focus on established artists and that the neurological studies could just as well be 
carried out on the participants in the painting class at the local community college, we free the 
investigation from the straightjacket of historical records and open up the possibility of 
gathering detailed and reliable data using cutting edge technology. And this is exactly what 
we thinks should happen. Rather than keep relying on notoriously gappy and unreliable 
historical records, data should be gathered on living painters, irrespective of their standing (or 
even participation) in the Art-world. In fact, this is the only way forward if we really want to 
understand the neurological basis of how visual representation works. 
 
In sum, the X in the investigation should not be ‘producing a work of Art’, but a particular 
skill like ‘producing a perspectival ink drawing’ or ‘producing a representation that is truthful 
with respect to colour’. This shift not only makes the problems with specificity and 
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individuality go away (and hence allows us to use MDD); it also gives investigators the 
possibility to choose contemporary subjects who have no recognition in the art world (and 
who may not even aspire to so being recognised) on which data can be generated using 
cutting edge technology. It is such data rather than sketchy historical records that should be 
used in a study of the neurology of art.  
 
 
4. Qualms about Top-Down Approaches 
 
Before outlining in more detail (in Section 5) what we regards as a more promising approach 
to neuroaesthetics, we would like to have closer look at a parallel case, the debate over the 
neurological underpinnings of the cognitive notion of a visual representation, which also 
suggests that the focus on Art is a red herring. 
 
Let us start by setting the stage. There are two possible approaches to cognitive neuroscience: 
the traditional top-down approach, and the more controversial bottom up approach, where, in 
this context, by ‘top’ we mean the level of mental phenomena as we experience them (seeing 
a house, feeling sad, wanting to sleep, etc.) and ‘down’ refers to the level of brain states 
(patters of neuron firing, etc.). The difference between the two is best illustrated through a 
slightly revised version of Dennett’s bridge analogy, in which he describes top-down 
cognitive neuroscience as ‘reverse engineering’ (Dennett 1998, 255). Consider someone who 
has no knowledge of engineering, but who takes interest in the workings of a particular 
bridge. This person could start by look at the bridge and identifying certain functional units 
like the deck, the pillars, the pillar foundations, the anchorage blocks, the suspenders and the 
suspension cables. There are certain ways in which these fit together and understanding how 
the bridge works involves understanding how these parts fit together: the pillar foundations 
carry the pillars, the suspensions are fixed at the top of the pillars, the suspension cables are 
connected to the suspensions and they carry the platform. These macro concepts provide a 
good description of the bridge and the person can now tell what each of the bridge pieces do, 
which parts are integral to structural integrity, etc. But this does not yet satisfy the person; she 
also wants to know why and how the parts can perform their function. So she starts looking at 
the materials used and the way they are connected: the foundation blocks are made from 
concrete, the pillars are metal bars riveted together in particular way, the deck is a 
combination of stone and steel, etc. The more she knows about the constitution of each parts, 
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the better she understands how these parts work and why the entire bridge holds together. In 
sum, the person first develops a well worked out macro-theory of the bridge, and then asks 
what kind of micro-constitution allows the various parts identified in the macro-theory to 
work in the way they do. 
 
This approach contrasts with a bottom-up method. This method does not require a well-
worked out macro-theory in order to start investigating the micro level; in fact, it tell us not to 
have one – and if we happen to have one to put it to the side for the time being. The way 
forward, on this view, is not to look for the micro underpinnings of a finished macro theory, 
but to start tampering with the micro structure directly and observe how changes at the micro 
bear on broad issues we are interested in. In the case of the bridge, for example, the bottom-up 
method denies that we first have to describe the bridge in macro terms like ‘piller’ and 
‘foundation’ and then ask what the constitution of a piller and a foundation is; instead it 
invites us to ponder directly what effect it would have on the stability of the bridge if we 
replaced, say, rivets by screws, used wood instead of steel in certain places, etc. This would 
lead to an understanding of the effect of micro changes on the functioning of the bridge, but 
without presupposing a particular macro conceptualisation of it. 
 
Starting the investigation with the notion of Art, and a view about what art is and how it has 
to be understood, amounts to adopting a top down approach: it presupposes a clear 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and then asks how the different 
elements of our understanding of Art are realised at the neurological level.10 It is easy to see 
why a top-down approach seems to be appealing to Zaidel’s project. For one, the top-down 
method seems generally tidier and more systematic than the somewhat messy and anarchic 
bottom-up approach. For another, especially in a field in which there already exists a body of 
knowledge it would seem to be natural to take this knowledge into account. 
 
Is this the right choice? This is not the first time that a problem of this nature has been 
presented to the philosophical community. A similar issue has been well discussed throughout 
the philosophical and cognitive neuroscience literature about the long standing debate 
between Kosslyn and Pylyshyn concerning the cognitive notion of visual representation (VR). 
We will now discuss this case in some detail, which brings us to the conclusion that, first 
                                                
10 In fact, she is specifically evoking common cognitive science methodology and not the straight neurological 
methodology the title of her work implies. 
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impressions notwithstanding, a bottom-up methodology seems to be more appropriate for 
neuroaesthetics than a top-down approach. 
 
VR is defined in this discussion as what it involves for someone to imagine something 
(Pylyshyn 2003); that is, when it involves for someone to have an image of something in her 
head. As imagining something is a cognitive concept, evoking such thing as images and 
imagining and thought (not traditionally language used in strict neuropsychology), the 
cognitivists, most recently encouraged by Pylyshyn, were the first to try and create a 
‘cognitive map’ or theory that would help explain this common experience. This theory of VR 
would outline precisely what is happening when we imagine something visually; it would, as 
it were, provide us with the anatomy of visual representation, detailing which kind of 
cognitive capacities are involved in imagery, how they fit together, and how they relate to the 
capacities involved in other task such as verbal expression. To come back to Dennett’s 
analogy, this theory of VR would be like the description of the bridge in terms of concepts 
like ‘pillar’ and ‘platform’. Such a theory is regarded by cognitivists as the indispensable 
starting point of every investigation into how VR functions at the level of the brain – without 
such a macro theory, so the cognitivists think, one cannot even begin addressing this issue. 
 
However, Pylyshyn quickly ran into a problem. Due to cognitive theory being so dependent 
on semantic content, there seemed to be no real way to create one static theory that would 
account for all forms of VR. For instance, if a cognitivist decided to examine the cognitive 
aspects that were evoked when you imagined a man walking along the beach at sunset, you 
could be said to evoking cognitive semantic concepts such as water, sand, outdoors, humans 
(man), sunset etc. But if you were to imagine a fresh plate of sheet metal being produced by a 
machine in a factory, you would evoke semantic concepts that involve industrial centres, 
machinery, fire, ore, coal etc. A cognitive theory of VR would consist of a general schema of 
which both concrete cases would be an instance (in pretty much the same way in which the 
trajectories of planets orbiting around the sun and of heavy objects falling from towers are 
instances of the Newtonian laws of motion). Unfortunately it turned out that there seems to be 
no way to collate these two very distinct and different visual representations into any one 
unified cognitive theory. In fact, it turns out that it is not even clear what format such a theory 
should have – an issue that was the source of a rousing debate: in even considering the 
problem of visual representation, Pylyshyn states that you are automatically evoking the 
argument that ‘thought’ is pictorial (as opposed to linguistic) in format. However, 
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understanding the ‘format’ of ‘thought’ does not seem possible until you have a better idea of 
what you are looking at, and as the cognitivists seem unable to agree what VR really is on a 
cognitive level, a unified theory of VR seems unattainable. 
 
This has severe consequences. Due to this inability to assume any format, no upper ground 
was solidified as a basis for a top-down cognitive to neurological explanation of the 
cognitive/phenomenal aspects of VR. For Pylyshyn, if there is no solid ‘upper ground’ theory 
of VR, then a top-down neurological explanation of VR simply does not exist and not only 
has the project of a neurological reduction failed, but there seems no viable starting point for 
researching and understanding the complexities of VR at all. 
 
Art seems to be much like VR in that it is a multilayered, highly complex and context-
sensitive concept, and hence it is unlikely that there will ever be a unifying theory about Art 
that would provide the starting point for a neurological top-down reduction11. As a 
consequence, Pylyshyn’s conclusion concerning the prospects of a neurological reduction of 
VR seem to carry over to Art unscathed: it can’t be done! 
 
This leaves two options: biting the bullet and regarding reduction as impossible, or choosing 
an alternative methodology. Neurologist Kosslyn opted for the latter. He decided to forgo all 
cognitive definitions, explanations and assumptions of VR and worked to develop a theory of 
VR from the bottom-up perspective. In essence this means that research is guided not by a 
high-level theory but by practical issues; more specifically, a subject is confronted with a 
particular task and then it is observed which parts of the brain are involved in tackling that 
task. This can be done either by observing the subject’s brain in a MRI or CT scanning device 
while she deals with the task, or by observing subjects suffering from a particular brain 
conditions and then comparing them with healthy subjects. Consider, for example, Maguire et 
al.’s (2006) study of navigation. In order to find out what role the hippocampus plays in our 
ability to navigate in spaces that we have become acquainted with long time ago, a taxi driver 
with bilateral hippocampal lesion as well as several control taxi drivers were asked to 
navigate in a interactive virtual reality simulation of central London. The investigation found 
                                                
11 In her review of Zaidel’s book, Franz (2006) seems sympathetic to the idea that Zaidel’s research question 
does not seem well defined, which could be one of the reasons why it is so hard for Zaidel to develop an easy to 
state research programme. Brown (2006) also feels that the cognitive aspects of Zaidel’s have not been given 
enough justice, which could be another reason a top-down methodology does not seem to fit her current project. 
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that the hippocampus is not required for general orientation relying on main roads, but that it 
plays a role when it comes to navigating in areas off the main roads. The salient point here is 
that no cognitive theory of navigation – let alone a complete and accurate one – is 
presupposed; the investigation bypasses this step and simply asks is and what is not important 
when a subject is actively participating in the activity you wish to study. 
 
Through use of two of this method, Kosslyn discovered that the reason why VR intuitively 
seems to be so similar to vision is that the areas of the brain used for VR share two thirds of 
the cortical space of normal vision. In fact, visual representations are actually represented 
within the visual cortex in a very similar way to how the visual cortex processes normal sight: 
the difference between VR and normal sight seemed simply to be the origin of the information 
processed. In the case of normal vision, the information came directly through our eyes from 
the real world. In the case of VR, the information was taken from our memory systems and 
then collated throughout the visual cortex (Kosslyn, Ganis and Thompson 2003).  Despite not 
having a theory of visual representation, Kosslyn was none the less, through bottom-up 
exploration of the issue, able to find out how it worked and develop a working theory that 
helped us understand more about this phenomena. 
 
Since Art is much like VR, this case shows the dangers involved in subscribing to a top-down 
method: we may be lead to nihilism where interesting insights could be gained by using other 
methods because a misplaced focus on Art (and the high level theory attached to it) comes to 
stand in the way of progress that could be made in our understanding of neurological 
processes that are involved in aesthetic judgments. 
 
 
5. The Neuropsychology of Art Revised 
 
The arguments in Sections 3 and 4 converge towards the same point: the focus on Art is a 
dead end for neuroaesthetics. Progress is more likely to be made if the investigation, first, 
focuses on ‘local’ themes rather than Art; second, uses controlled laboratory environments to 
generate data rather then trying to extract information from historical records; and third also 
pays attention to aspects of the appreciation of art. Let us address these points one at a time, 
beginning with the latter. 
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As we have pointed out in Section 3, the focus on established artists is both unnecessary and 
detrimental to the project of neuroaesthetics. The project of gathering information about 
eminent historical figures from historical records is doomed to failure from the start because 
these records do not provide information which meets the needs of modern neuroscience as 
regards precision, detail, and specificity. Instead neuroscientist interested in aesthetics should 
investigate the workings of the brain of persons engaging in art-related practises no matter 
what their standing (or even participation) in the Art-world and observe their brains while 
they do so using all means available in a modern laboratory (for instance MRI, fMRI, PET, 
EEG, and MEG). This is because relevant issues can be investigated using any subjects with 
some artistic talent or interest: one does not need the great artists, simple art school students 
would do. The data collected would be far stronger and more controlled then that gleaned 
from partial and possibly misleading medical records, and they would provide a more solid 
and reliable basis for an understanding of the brain-processes involved in art-related activities. 
 
Studying living subjects would have two further advantages. First, although attributing 
changes in the production of art to a specific change in the brain is a first step, it is not more 
than that. A complete investigation on the neuropsychology of art would need to include a 
way of obtaining information regarding brain activity throughout all stages of the artistic 
process. It would be helpful to understand how each region is involved in first conception, 
then first sketches, then filling out the colour and the idea all the way to the final draft then 
work completion. It may even be useful to examine the difference in response to the artist 
looking at the final work. This would give us data representing a holistic approach to the 
neuropsychology of art, and a rough sketch as to how the system as a whole is structured. If a 
rough sketch of the whole system can be obtained, then any information we can gather 
regarding specific system damage can be discussed in its context.  
 
Second, studying broken systems is a difficult job that neurologists excel at: one could claim 
that the majority of modern neuroscience is based on breaking and examining the brain12. 
However other methods have become available in recent years: we now have the technology 
and knowledge to bypass studying broken systems and instead focus on watching the brain 
function correctly. That is, we no longer need to break aspects of the brain to find out what 
                                                
12 For a closer examination on the problems studying broken systems present, see Glymour (1994) 
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they do, we can watch the brain work as a whole system uninterrupted while real artists work 
using the above-mentioned technologies.13  
 
Let us now return to the first of the above issues: what questions should be addressed by 
neuroaesthetics. There seem to be at least three kinds of questions that neuroscience could 
meaningfully address (needless to say, this list is in no way exhaustive). The first family of 
questions concerns technical aspects in the execution of a piece of visual art. Neuroscience is 
well equipped to study the effects of the use of perspective, colour, shading, symmetries, 
distortions, thickness of lines, and many more, for instance by observing what happens in a 
person’s brain when they produce or see, say, a drawing using one-point perspective and 
comparing it to the brain of people who do (or are not able to) see or produce such images. 
Indeed, there already is a wealth of information about some of these issues available. For 
instance, the functioning of the visual cortex and the eye itself have been studied extensively, 
which can lead to studies that help us understand the physical (and emotional) response we 
feel when looking at certain colours, or certain shades, or certain oblique lines. 
 
Some studies are helping us make leeway on these difficult topics. For instance, extensive 
studies have already been carried out on how our brain uses ganglion cells to see and interpret 
colour, light, and shading (Livingstone and Hubel 1988), how our brain can see and 
distinguish between different types of colour (Martin 1998) and how we physiologically pick 
up movement and lines within our visual field (Merrigan and Maunsell 1993). Understanding 
vision in this way could well be the first step to understanding how these specific images or 
specific colours/tones/shades affect other neural centres engaged in memory or emotion, 
ultimately helping us understand the neurology of how art affects us. 
 
The second group of issues centres around the phenomenon of creative impulse. One person 
looks at a sunset and simply wants to enjoy its beauty while another person sees the same 
sunset and is compelled to recreate it in drawing or painting, or capture the emotion that it 
evokes in them some way. Is there a difference in the brain function of these two persons? In 
studying the difference between what someone with creative impulse does with their 
                                                
13 Section 3 of Zaidel’s contribution to this book may be read as suggesting that the aim of the investigation is 
not so much correlating certain artistic skills (or loss thereof) with certain precisely circumscribed parts of the 
brain, but rather to show that artistic talent, skill and creativity are diffusely located in the brain and do not have 
a particular centre. Even if this is the goal, the problems remain the same: our failure to precisely locate certain 
conditions does not imply that they have no precise location.  
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perception in comparison with someone who does not have any creative drive at all may give 
us a starting point to understanding the creation of art.14 
 
The third group of questions focuses on the appreciation of art. Although the emphasis in 
studying art usually is on the artist, the audience plays an important role too – pieces of art are 
produced with the intention that they be appreciated as such. This can lead to the study of 
those who call themselves ‘art appreciators’. What goes on in the brain of someone who 
appreciates, say, a drawing as a piece of art as opposed to regarding it simply as a provider of 
information about the spatial arrangement of certain objects? One could study this difference, 
for instance, by investigating the difference between a subject observing a picture just as a 
picture (for instance a photograph in a newspaper article) and compare this to the neurological 
affect of them observing that same photograph as a work of art in an art exhibition. This in 
itself would give us some clue as to how the brain processes and recognises art in different 
forms, and allow us to examine different perspective of one experiencing art. 
 
None of these three areas of study amount, in themselves, to the study of Art, but it is 
plausible that studies such as these will give us vital information that could, at some later 
point, also contribute to the neurological study to the more cognitive, phenomenological and 
aesthetic aspects of art. Finding the necessary neurological conditions for artistic skill 
(technique), creative impulse, recognition and appreciation may very well be the key to truly 
understanding the neuroscience of art, and potentially also help us understanding how our 
capability to produce art relates to (and depends on) our general cognitive capacities for 
everyday survival activities such as general motoric skills as well as auditory, spatial and 
visual mechanisms (Brown 2006, 356). 
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